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I.  THE VENEZUELAN NON REELECTION TRADITION AND THE 
PRINCIPLE OF REPUBLICAN “ALTERNABILIDAD” 
 
Since the beginning of the Republic, the general restriction for elected 
officials to be reelected in a continuous way, without limits, has been a 
tradition in the Venezuelan Constitutional history, having Venezuela adopted 
since 1811, as occurred in all Latin America countries, the presidential system 
of government.
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 The restriction to presidential reelection was first established 
in the 1830 Constitution, as a reaction to continuity in office (continuísmo), 
precisely in order to confront individuals’ anxieties to perpetuate themselves 
in power, and to avoid the advantages that public officials in office could have 
in electoral processes. 
The reaction against continuity in power was clearly expressed by 
Simón Bolívar in his famous Angostura Speech (1819) when he said: 
 
” The continuation of the authority in the same individual has frequently been the 
end of democratic governments. Repeated elections are essentials in popular 
systems, because nothing is more dangerous than to leave for a long term the same 
citizen in power.  The people get used to obey him, and he gets used to command 
them; from were usurpation and tyranny is originated….Our citizens must fear with 
more than enough justice that the same Official, who has governed them for a long 
time, could perpetually command them.”3   
                                                 
1
  Paper for the Panel Discussion on “Venezuela Referendum: Public Opinion, 
Economic Impact and Constitutional Implications,” (Panelists: Luis Vicente León, 
Alejandro Grisanti, Allan R. Brewer-Carías; Moderator: Christopher Sabatini), Americas 
Society/Council of the Americas, New York, February 9, 2009. 
2
  Restrictions to presidential reelection are traditional in the presidential system of 
government, and not in the parliamentary system of government mainly followed in 
Europe. See Allan R. Brewer-Carías, Reflexiones sobre la Revolución Norteamericana 
(1776), la Revolución Francesa (1789) y la Revolución Hispanoamericana (1810-1830) y 
sus aportes al constitucionalismo moderno, Universidad Externado de Colombia, Bogotá 
2008, pp. 106 ff. 
3
  “La continuación de la autoridad en un mismo individuo frecuentemente ha sido el 
término de los gobiernos democráticos. Las repetidas elecciones son esenciales en los 
sistemas populares, porque nada es tan peligroso como dejar permanecer largo tiempo en 
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This principle of limiting the term of elected Officials called in 
Venezuelan constitutional law as the principle of “alternabilidad,” from the 
Latin word “alternatium,” which means “interchangeably” or “by turns.” In 
Spanish it has the same meaning and when referring to public offices or public 
positions means the idea that elected public offices must be occupied by turns, 
and not continuously by the same elected person. It is in this same sense that 
the Supreme Tribunal of Justice of Venezuela in a decision of 2002 issued by 
its Electoral Chamber, said that alternabilidad means “the successive exercise 
of public offices by different persons” (Decision No. 51 of March 18, 2002.)
4
 
The principle, consequently, is not the same as the “elective” principle or to be 
elected for public offices. To be elected is one thing, and another is to occupy 
public offices by turns.   
The principle has always been establishing in a “rock like” or 
immutable constitutional clause (Cláusula pétrea), in the sense that it must 
never be changed. That is why Article 6 of the Constitution says: “The 
government of the Republic and of its political entities is and will always be” 
alternativo, in addition to “democratic, participatory, elective, decentralized, 
responsible, plural and of repeal mandates,”
5
 which mean that it cannot be 
changed. 
The principle has been included in almost all the Venezuelan 
Constitutions since 1830 (1830, 1858, 1864, 1874, 1881, 1891, 1893, 1901, 
1904, 1909, 1936, 1845 and 1947),
6
 establishing a general prohibition for the 
immediate reelection of the President of the Republic for the next term. In the 
1961 Constitution the prohibition for reelection was extended up to two terms 
(10 years), and it was in the current 1999 Constitution that the provision was 
made more flexible, by establishing for the first time in more than a century 
                                                                                                                                                     
un mismo ciudadano el poder. El pueblo se acostumbra a obedecerle y él se acostumbra a 
mandarlo; de donde se origina la usurpación y la tiranía. … nuestros ciudadanos deben 
temer con sobrada justicia que el mismo Magistrado, que los ha mandado mucho tiempo, 
los mande perpetuamente.” See in Simón Bolívar, Escritos Fundamentales, Caracas, 1982. 
4
  Quoted in the Dissenting Vote to the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme 
Tribunal of Justice Decision No. 53, of February 2, 2009 (Interpretation of articles 340,6 
and 345 of the Constitution Case), in http:/www.tsj.gov.ve/decisions/scon/Febrero/53-
3209-2009-08-1610.html   
5
  “Article 5. El gobierno de la República Bolivariana de Venezuela y de las entidades 
políticas que la componen es y será siempre democrático, participativo, electivo, 
descentralizado, alternativo, responsable, pluralista y de mandatos revocables”.  
6  See the text of all the Constitutions in Allan R. Brewer-Carías, Las Constituciones 
de Venezuela, 2 vols., Academia de Ciencias Políticas y Sociales, Caracas 2008.  
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the possibility for the immediate reelection of the President, but only once, for 
the next term (article 230).  
The fact is that in Venezuelan history, the only Constitutions not 
providing for the prohibition for presidential reelection was the short lived 
1857 Constitution, the authoritarian Constitutions of the period of Juan 
Vicente Gómez (1914-1933), and the 1953 Constitution of Marcos Pérez 
Jiménez, who were two of the dictators we had during the last century.  
On the other hand, another fact to bear in mind is that each time that the 
principle of non reelection has been changed through disputed constitutional 
reforms, the outcome has been a political crisis ending in the overthrow of the 
government. It occurred in 1858 with the pretension of continuity of President 
José Tadeo Monagas, who after reforming the Constitution in 1857 was outset 
a few month later by the Julián Castro March Revolution. It happened in 1891 
when President Raimundo Andueza Palacios also reformed the Constitution in 
order to allow him to be reelected, being overthrown the next year in 1892 by 
the Joaquin Crespo Legalist Revolution. It also occurred, although in another 
context, in 1945, with the constitutional reform promoted by President Isaías 
Medina Angarita that failed to establish the direct presidential election, 
allowing the continuation of the indirect presidential election of the 
government candidates by, Congress, a fact that contributed to the 1945 
October Revolution. And, finally, it occurred in 1957 when Marcos Pérez 
Jiménez convened a referendum (plebiscite) to approve his own reelection, 
which led, the next year, to the Democratic Revolution of 1958.
7
 This shows 
that nor always the countries follow the lessons of history, and frequently the 
result has been the unwanted repetition of similar facts.   
In any case, the restriction established in the current 1999 Constitution 
for the reelection of the President of the Republic (article 230); and the similar 
provisions establishing reelection restrictions in the cases of Governors and 
Mayors and of representatives to the National Assembly and to the State 
Legislative Councils (articles 160, 162, 174, 192), are the ones that have been 
proposed to be changed through a Constitutional Amendment that the 
Venezuelan people are going to vote on next Sunday February 15, 2009. 
II.  THE LIMITS IMPOSED BY THE CONSTITUTION REGARDING 
THE CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW MEANS 
The 1999 Constitution establishes three institutional mechanisms for 
constitutional review, distinguishable according to the importance and 
                                                 
7  See Allan R. Brewer-Carías, Historia Constitucional de Venezuela, 2 vols., 
Editorial Alfa, Caracas 2008. 
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magnitude of the changes proposed, which includes the “Constitutional 
Amendment,” the “Constitutional Reform,” and the National Constituent 
Assembly.  The “Constitutional Amendment” procedure is established for the 
purpose of adding or of modifying one or more provisions to the Constitution 
without altering its fundamental structure (article 340); and the “Constitutional 
Reforms”, is designed for partial revisions of the Constitution and for the 
substitution of one or several provisions but also without modifying its 
structure and fundamental principles (article 342). Both procedures, have in 
common that they need to be approved by referendum, and cannot be used to 
change fundamental constitutional principles or the structure of the 
Constitution. Only through a National Constituent Assembly the Constitution 
can be reviewed in order to “transform the State, to create a new legal order, and 
to write a new Constitution" (Articles 347). 
On the other hand, the Constitution establishes the effects of the popular 
rejection of a “constitutional reform,” in the sense that a similar proposal 
cannot be filed again before the National Assembly in the remainder of the 
constitutional term (Article 345). Nothing is established in the Constitution 
regarding the effects of the rejection of “constitutional amendments,” and also, 
nothing is established regarding the possibility to file the same rejected 
“constitutional reform” proposal, through the procedure of a “constitutional 
amendment,” as it is now occurring.   
The case is a matter of interpretation and of determining the intention of 
the Constituent power, which in my opinion was to establish a limit regarding 
the possibility of repeatedly asking the direct expression of the will of the 
people by referenda. That is, once the people have express their popular will 
through a referendum, it is not possibly to asked the people again and again, 
without limits, on the same matters in the same constitutional term. 
The matter of the continuous presidential reelection was already 
proposed through a “constitutional reform” draft formulated by the President 
of the Republic in 2007 and was rejected by the people in the Referendum 
held on December 2007.
8
 Nonetheless, at the suggestion of the same President 
of the Republic, one year later, the National Assembly voted last month 
(January 15
th,
 2009) a modification of the Constitution, using now the 
“Constitutional Amendment” procedure, initially intended to establish the 
possibility for the indefinite and continuous reelection of the President of the 
Republic, which was later extended to all elected public offices. 
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  See Allan R. Brewer-Carías, La reforma constitucional de 2007 (Comentarios al 
proyecto inconstitucionalmente sancionado por la Asamblea Nacional el 2 de noviembre de 
2007), Editorial Jurídica Venezolana, Caracas 2007.  
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III.  THE BINDING CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION ISSUED 
BY THE SUPREME TRIBUNAL  
Two questions with constitutional implication result from this new 
“amendment” proposal that have been the object of endless constitutional 
discussions and legal contention in the country:  
First, the possibility to use a “constitutional amendment” procedure 
through which no fundamental constitutional principle can be changed, in 
order to alter and change the principle of alternabilidad of the government 
that is a fundamental republican principle formulated in article 6 of the 
Constitution; and  
Second, the possibility to use the “constitutional amendment” 
procedure to include the continuous election of the President of the Republic, 
changing the limits imposed in the Constitution (reelection only once, for the 
next period), which was a proposal already submitted to referendum in 
December 2007, and rejected by the people.  
It has been on these matters that the Constitutional Chamber of the 
Supreme Tribunal of Justice issued last week (February 3, 2009), two 
decisions (No. 46 and 53)
9
 in which a binding interpretation of the 
Constitution has been established:  
First, regarding the possibility of submitting to popular vote a 
modification of the Constitution via “constitutional amendment” on the same 
matter already rejected by the people in a “constitutional reform” procedure 
held during the same constitutional term. The Constitutional Chamber has 
argued that the limit imposed in the Constitution was directed only to the 
National Assembly to discuss again a constitutional reform on the same 
subject once rejected by the people, without considering the substantive aspect 
of the prohibition regarding the limits to ask again and again the people, to 
express in an endless way their will, through referenda. 
Second, regarding the possibility of using the “constitutional 
amendment” procedure in order to change the fundamental principle of 
                                                 
9
  See the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Tribunal of Justice Decision No. 
53, of February 3, 2009 (Interpretation of articles 340,6 and 345 of the Constitution Case), 
in http:/www.tsj.gov.ve/decisions/scon/Febrero/53-3209-2009-08-1610.html. See the 
comments on that decision in Allan R. Brewer-Carías, El Juez Constitucional vs. La 
alternabilidad republicana. Notas sobre la sentencia de la Sala Constitucional de 03-02 
2009 que declara constitucional el proceso de Enmienda Constitucional 2008-2009 que 
altera el principio de alternabilidad del gobierno, al establecer la reelección indefinida de 
cargos electivos y que se someterá a referendo el 15-02-2009, in 
www.allanbrewercarias.com, Section I, 2 (Documents), 2009. 
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alternabilidad in government, which means that public offices must be 
occupied by turns, and not continuously by the same elected person, the 
Constitutional Chamber has said that what the principle of alternabilidad 
imposes “is for the people as sovereign to have the possibility to periodically 
elect their representatives,” confusing “gobierno alternativo” with “gobierno 
electivo” that is, the principle that elected public offices must be occupied by 
turns, with the principle of election of representatives, considering that the 
principle of alternabilidad can only be infringed if the possibility to have 
elections is impeded.    
With these decisions, what the Supreme Tribunal has made, in addition 
to resolving the constitutional challenges to the February 15
th
 referendum is, 
through a constitutional interpretation, to modify or mutate the text of the 
Constitution, changing the sense of the prohibition of subsequent calling for 
referendum on the same matters, and also changing the sense of a 
constitutional principle like the principle of alternabilidad in government 
considering it alike to the principle of elective government, ignoring the 
difference established in the Constitution (article 6). 
IV.  THE REMAINING CONSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS 
Finally, one constitutional implication of the February 15
th
 2009 
Referendum remains unsolved and it is the one resulting from the question 
itself as has been proposed to the people, in which it is difficult to find its 
clear intention to establish the possibility of continuous reelection in public 
offices.   
The proposed question, in effect, has been formulated as follow: 
 
“Do you approve of the amendment of articles 160,162,174,192 and 230 of the 
Constitution of the Republic prepared by initiative of the National Assembly, which 
extends the political rights of the people in order to allow any citizen in exercise of 
a public office by popular election to become a candidate to the same office for the 





If the purpose of the constitutional amendment is to eliminate the 
restriction for reelection of all elected public officials and representatives 
                                                 
10
  “¿Aprueba usted la enmienda de los artículos 160, 162, 174, 192 y 230 de la 
Constitución de la Republica tramitada por iniciativa de la Asamblea Nacional, que amplia 
los derechos políticos del pueblo con el fin de permitir que cualquier ciudadano o 
ciudadana en ejercicio de un cargo de elección popular pueda ser sujeto de postulación 
como candidato o candidata para el mismo cargo por el tiempo establecido 
constitucionalmente, dependiendo su elección exclusivamente del voto popular?”. 
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established in the five articles of the Constitution, to allow them be reelected 
without limits in a continuous and indefinite way, why this is not clearly 
stated? In other words, why the words “reelection,” “indefinite” or 
“continuous” reelection are not used?  
On the other hand, in any case of constitutional amendments, if 
approved, it must be published as a continuation of the Constitution without 
altering the original text, but the amended articles must have a footnote 
referring to the number and date of their amendments. The question in this 
case of next Sunday referendum, if the constitutional amendment is approved, 
is to know exactly how the texts of the five amended articles are going to be 
written, or if the matter is going to remain forever to be subject to 
interpretation. With the question as it has been formulated, the result will be to 
eliminate the limits imposed in articles 162 and 192 of the Constitution 
regarding the representatives to the State Legislative Councils and to the 
National Assembly to be reelected only for up to two terms; and in articles, 
160, 174, and 230 regarding the President of the Republic, the Governors of 
the States and the Municipal mayors to be reelected only once for an 
immediate new term.  
These are in my opinion some of the constitutional implications of the 
Referendum of next Sunday in Venezuela. The President of the Republic has 
considered it as a process “vital for the revolution,”
11
 consequently what now 
remains are for the people to also consider it a process vital for the future of 







                                                 
11  In his weekly program Aló President, January 11, 2009. 
